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Some Evolutionary Foundations for Price Level Rigidity
By GILLES SAINT-PAUL*
This paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly
rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb. In the model, ﬁrms
must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks. Their payoff depends on
the level of aggregate demand, as well as on their own price and their “neighbor’s”
price. The latter assumption captures local interactions. Despite the fact that the
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is characterized by a simple pricing rule
that ﬁrms can easily adopt, the economy does not converge to the REE for all
parameter values. When the volatility of monetary innovations is low and interac-
tions among ﬁrms are high, the aggregate price level exhibits rigidity, in that it does
not fully react to contemporaneous aggregate demand shocks. We discuss the role
of the nature of experimentation, and of path dependence driven by interactions, in
explaining these results. (JEL D83, D84, E3)
An important cornerstone of contemporary
macroeconomic theory is the idea that the price
level does not react one for one to nominal
aggregate demand shocks. Otherwise, aggregate
demand shocks would have a zero impact on
real activity. It is therefore important to inves-
tigate the sources of such price rigidity. Histor-
ically, the literature has considered three
options: assuming ﬁxed and exogenous prices,
imposing that prices can be changed only infre-
quently, and relying on some ﬁxed “menu cost”
of changing prices.
1 None of these options,
however, is fully satisfactory.
In this paper, we investigate another route,
namely, the extent to which sticky price-setting
behavior may evolve as an equilibrium outcome
in an economy populated by imperfectly ratio-
nal agents. We assume that such agents are not
able to compute their optimal price-setting rule,
and instead have to make experiments with
rules of thumb. They drop rules that yield a low
payoff in favor of those that yield a high payoff.
Firms are affected by the behavior of other
ﬁrms because that behavior affects the aggre-
gate price level. Another important ingredient
of the model is local interaction, which is a
simple local productive externality. It implies
that an agent’s payoff function depends on the
price chosen by another, “contiguous” agent.
A crucial aspect of the model is that it is
impossible to separate learning from action. Ex-
periments have to be carried out on a full-scale
basis, using the price charged by the ﬁrm to all
its customers. By experimenting, ﬁrms exert ex-
ternalities on other ﬁrms, because of local inter-
actions and their impact on the aggregate price
level. Consequently, experimentation by one
agent affects the rules picked up by other agents.
We then ask the following questions: Does
the economy converge to the REE? If not, do
we observe any recognizable pattern in the be-
havior of aggregate prices?
2
Despite that the REE price setting rule is
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1 See Robert J. Barro and Herschel I. Grossman (1971),
Jean-Pascal Be ´nassy (1975, 1976), John B. Taylor (1980),
Stanley Fischer (1977), Olivier J. Blanchard and Nobuhiro
Kiyotaki (1987), Julio J. Rotemberg (1982), Andrew S.
Caplin and Daniel F. Spulber (1987), Ricardo J. Caballero
and Eduardo Engel (1993), N. Gregory Mankiw (1985), and
George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen (1985).
2 The model can also potentially be used to derive pre-
dictions about the cross-sectional distribution of prices and
its evolution through time, but this is a complex issue which
we leave for further research.
765feasible, i.e., belongs to the set of rules that can
be used by individual agents, it turns out that for
a range of parameters the economy does not
converge to that equilibrium. Rather, it con-
verges to an equilibrium where the aggregate
price level does not react one for one to con-
temporary money shocks, and is less volatile
than money, contrary to what should happen in
the REE. Furthermore, money is roughly neu-
tral in the long run if the autocorrelation of
money shocks is high, but not if it is low. To
summarize, this economy exhibits the stylized
macroeconomic properties of actual economies.
As we discuss below in greater detail, sticky
price behavior arises from the combination of
two factors: a low variance of monetary inno-
vations, and a high degree of interaction among
ﬁrms. If monetary innovations are very volatile,
then the economy roughly converges to the
REE. If interactions among ﬁrms are shut down,
the economy also converges to the REE.
Experimentation by individual ﬁrms trying
to ﬁnd a better pricing rule plays a key role in
generating these results. They sometimes
change their behavior “at the margin” (local
mutation), and sometimes experiment with an
entirely new rule (global randomization). In
such a case, the new rule will typically not
exhibit money neutrality, reﬂecting the ﬁrms’
lack of awareness of such a property when
randomly picking a new rule. We show that
even though global randomization occurs very
infrequently, interactions among ﬁrms, along
with a low volatility of monetary innovations,
generate such strong path dependence that, even
after a very long learning period, the price level
does not fully react to nominal aggregate de-
mand shocks.
While our variables are interpreted in terms
of “money” and “prices,” the model may pro-
vide evolutionary foundations for “rigid” be-
havior in a variety of settings.
3
The literature on evolution and adaptive
learning is large, but has scarcely dealt with
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
4 A recent excep-
tion is Albert Marcet and Juan Pablo Nicolini
(2003), who are able to obtain recurrent hyper-
inﬂations in a Sargent-Wallace (1973) style
model where they impose an adaptive learning
model. To my knowledge, the present paper is
the ﬁrst to deal with price level stickiness.
5
Existing applications of adaptive learning to
macroeconomics include Ramon Marimon et al.
(1990), who deal with a problem of equilibrium
selection based on Kiyotaki and Randall Wright
(1989). Thomas J. Sargent (1993) presents var-
ious applications of bounded rationality to mac-
roeconomics, including an interesting one on
the paradox of trade, but none of them is about
deriving price stickiness and monetary policy
effectiveness from evolutionary principles. Jas-
mina Arifovic (1996, 2001), derives persistent
ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate in the context
of a model where the rational expectations equi-
librium is indeterminate. Applications to the
time series properties of artiﬁcial stock markets
have been studied by Blake LeBaron et al.
(1999). Older applications to growth theory are
found in Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter
(1985), who develop a model of individual
ﬁrms that learn about their optimal capital/labor
ratio by trial and error.
A number of recent papers deal with price
formation under near-rationality when people
do not use all the available information (see
Laurence Ball, 2000; Mankiw and Ricardo
Reis, 2002). Michael Woodford (2002), extends
the Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1972) model of mis-
perceptions by adding strong interactions
among ﬁrms, as in the present paper, and noise
in the subjective perceptions of current condi-
tions. These papers consider very different de-
viations from rationality and learning processes
than the present one; in particular, they do not
3 In the working paper version of this paper, ﬁrms were
simply minimizing a quadratic loss function, which de-
pended on the difference between their choice variable and
an aggregate shock, in addition to the difference between
their choice variable and their neighbor’s choice variable.
The results were essentially the same, and clearly that can
be applied to a large variety of settings.
4 A substantial fraction is devoted to convergence of
Bayesian or least square learning to rational expectations.
See Margaret Bray (1982), George W. Evans and Seppo
Honhapohja (1995), Marcet and Sargent (1989), and Jean-
Michel Grandmont and Guy Laroque (1990).
5 In Marcet and Nicolini (2003), the learning process is
totally different from this paper’s, since experimentation
plays no role, nor do local interactions.
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which is this paper’s key focus.
Related papers in microeconomics include
Glenn Ellison (1993) and Ellison and Drew
Fudenberg (1993), who study the role of local
interaction in determining outcomes in evolu-
tionary games; and Joseph E. Harrington (1998,
1999), who shows, in particular, how rigid
agents may be more successful in evolutionary
hierarchical contests. None of this work is con-
cerned with macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
Interactions and externalities in the context of
the traditional sticky price literature (based on
menu costs or exogenously imposed timing re-
strictions on price setting) have been studied by
Ball and David Romer (1991), and Assar Lind-
beck and Dennis J. Snower (1999).
6 The
former, in particular, ﬁnd that money is more
likely to have signiﬁcant effects on prices, the
greater the degree of real rigidity (as deﬁned by
a ﬂat marginal cost curve) in price setting, and
the greater the strategic complementarities be-
tween producers’ price-setting behavior. This
paper’s results are similar in that aggregate
price inertia arises in the zone where local in-
teractions are strong.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section
I, we set up the model and derive the rational
expectations equilibrium. In Section II, we de-
scribe how pricing rules are set and how they
evolve by selection. Main numerical results are
reported in Section III, while Section IV dis-
cusses some intuition for these results. Section
V performs comparative statics and robustness
checks.
I. A Model
The model uses the standard toolboxes of
modern macroeconomic theory.
7 There are
overlapping generations of agents who live for
two periods. In the ﬁrst period of their life they
are endowed with a ﬁxed quantity of labor
which they supply to the market, and in the
second period they consume. Fiat money issued
by the government is the only store of value
between the two periods. We assume that proﬁts
are rebated to the young, as is seigniorage.
There are N differentiated goods, each pro-
duced by a monopoly. Utility is a composite
CES index of consumption of each good:





Denoting by Pit the price of good i at date t,
the demand for good i by an old worker with














is the usual aggregate price index. Aggregating,
we get the standard ﬁnal demand function for
good i:






where Mt is the total money stock held by the
old at date t.
8
An important ingredient in the model is the
existence of local interactions between ﬁrms.
To keep things simple we assume that each ﬁrm
i exerts a positive productive externality on its
“right neighbor,” deﬁned as ﬁrm i  1i fi  n,
and as ﬁrm 1 if i  n. That is, to produce yi units
of good i, it needs ayi
/yi1
(1) units of labor.
6 A more general analysis of the aggregate consequences
of local interactions has been developed by Steven N.
Durlauf (1991, 1996), and William Brock and Durlauf
(2001).
7 See, for example, Romer (2001) and Woodford (2003).
8 In this model, total nominal aggregate demand is given
only by Mt. The budget constraint of the young implies
wtLt  t  St  Mt1
where St is seignoriage and t is proﬁts. As St  Mt1 
Mt, that is equivalent to the income/expenditure identity
Yt  wtLt  t  Mt.
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put, yi1, increases ﬁrm i’s productivity. The
parameter  captures the intensity of local in-
teractions. The smaller is , the greater the
effect of a ﬁrm’s left neighbor on its productiv-
ity. Another form of interaction could be con-
sidered, such as ﬁrms buying intermediate
inputs from each other, but it would lead to a
more complex formulation.
9
Thus, denoting by wt the wage at date t, the
cost function for good i is
cyit, wt  ayit
wt/yi1
1.
The model is closed by specifying the labor
market. For simplicity, we assume real wages
are rigid, so that the nominal wage at t satisﬁes
wt  Pt; we also assume that the young’s labor
endowment is large enough so that the economy
will always be in an underemployment equilib-
rium, which prevents us from having to distin-
guish between different regimes. Such rigidity
can be interpreted as the outcome of minimum
wages, union wage setting, or efﬁciency
wages.
10
Firms maximize their current proﬁts, given
by
it  Pityit 	 cyit, wt.
For simplicity, we assume they neglect the
effect of their own price-setting decisions on the
aggregate price level.
11 At the beginning of
each period, all ﬁrms set their price Pit simul-
taneously, knowing the current money stock.











 yi  0
or equivalently
(1) Pit  Pt






The following proposition characterizes a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium, which will be
used as our benchmark.
PROPOSITION 1: There exists a symmetrical
rational expectations equilibrium such that
(i) Each ﬁrm sets the same price Pit  P0t







(iii) Total employment is given by
Lt  Nay*

9 Such a model has actually been tried. While the nu-
merical results are similar, that approach is plagued by
multimodality in a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function, which sometimes
drives equilibrium prices toward their numerical upper
bound and makes it difﬁcult to interpret the results. For this
reason, we stick with a simple local externality.
10 A fairly similar, but more complicated, model would
be obtained by assuming that the young do not work but
simply own claims to proﬁts, and that there exists an addi-
tional class of workers who live only one period, during
which they work and consume, and have a linear utility
function, with a constant marginal disutility of labor and a
constant marginal utility of consumption. They supply labor
with an inﬁnite elasticity at real wage , which pins it down
in the same way as in the model. The complication is that
one would then have to add the demand for goods coming
from these workers to compute the equilibrium level of
output and employment. On the other hand, assuming that
the young themselves are on their Walrasian labor supply
curve brings two complications. First, given that they con-
sume only in the following period, they face a nontrivial
optimization problem, since next period’s expected price
level affects their labor supply today. In the context of
evolutionary learning, one then has either to assume that
contrary to price-setters, they are fully rational, which is
somewhat inconsistent, or to specify a learning process for
optimal labor supply. It would then be difﬁcult to disentan-
gle its effects from those of adaptive learning by price-
setters, which is the main focus of this paper. Second, it
would introduce a genuine channel of nonneutrality of mon-
etary shocks, even in the fully rational case, since a tempo-
rary money shock increases expected inﬂation, thus
reducing the value of holding money, which in turn affects
labor supply. Our assumption of a rigid real wage in terms
of the current price level dispenses us from having to deal
with optimization by the young, and allows for a simple
benchmark rational expectations equilibrium such that nom-
inal prices are directly proportional to the money stock
regardless of the time series properties of the money supply
shock.
11 That makes the equilibrium much easier to compute
but does not affect the property that money is neutral.








then this is the only equilibrium.
PROOF:
See Appendix.
The equilibrium has the traditional dichot-
omy properties of models with ﬂexible prices. A
monetary shock has no real effect and only
increases all prices proportionally. In the ab-
sence of other sources of shocks, output and
employment are constant and equal to their nat-
ural level, which is affected by real rigidities 
but not by money. Uniqueness is important,
because when we consider bounded rationality,
we want to abstract from equilibrium selection
issues. Whenever the REE equilibrium is
unique, one is conﬁdent that any simulation that
does not converge to the equilibrium one has
computed is associated with a genuine deviation
from the REE rather than with selection of
another equilibrium.
II. Description of the Procedure
We study what happens when the economy is
populated not by proﬁt maximizers but by
boundedly rational ﬁrms which gradually learn
their payoff. These ﬁrms are experimenting
with alternative price rules and select the best
rules, i.e., those that yield the highest payoff.
A. The Money Creation Process
To minimize numerical problems, I assume
that the log of the money supply process, mt 
ln Mt, follows a stochastic process which con-
ﬁnes to the [0, 1] interval. I also constrain the
prices chosen to lie within that interval. Param-
eters will be chosen so that this feature does not
rule out the rational expectations equilibrium.
More speciﬁcally, I will impose that Ny*  1,
so that the REE pricing rule is just Pit  Mt.
The money process to which this economy is
subjected is an AR1:
(2) mt1  mt 
 t
where 
 is distributed uniformly over (m (1 
)  , m (1  )  ), with 0.5  m   1, and
  (1  )(1  m ).  thus parameterizes the
variance of innovations to the money stock and
is constrained so that the resulting values of mt
remain between 0 and 1.
B. Specifying Rules of Thumb
The learning procedure is speciﬁed as fol-
lows. At each date t, ﬁrm i’s information set is
given by Sit  {pit1, pi1,t1, mt1, mt},
where pit  ln Pit. That is, they use information
on current and lagged monetary shocks as well
as their left neighbor’s and own lagged price
level. For simplicity, we rule out the use of
variables with a greater lag, as well as prices set
by ﬁrms other than their left neighbor, i.e., the
one that exerts an externality on them.
Firms then behave according to a rule that
speciﬁes their log current price pit as a function
of that information set. This rule is speciﬁed as
follows:
12
(3) p ˆ it  c0,it  c1,itm ˆ t1  c2,itm ˆ t  c3,itp ˆ it1
 c4,itp ˆi1,t1.
The pricing rule followed by ﬁrm i at date t is
represented by the vector of parameters (c0, c1,
c2, c3, c4). The hat “ˆ” denotes the logistic
transformation:
12 Note that the problem is speciﬁed in “analog,” rather
than digital terms, as in Nelson and Winter (1985), but
contrary to the more recent literature which uses genetic
algorithms, classiﬁers, or neural networks. See the Santa Fe
Institute volumes (Philip N. Anderson et al., 1988; W. Brian
Arthur et al., 1997) for discussions. A previous attempt to
formulate the problem in terms of classiﬁer-style rules was
unsuccessful, essentially because mutation or generalization
of crucial bits yielded rules that made little sense.
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x
1 	 x.
The use of this transformation guarantees that
regardless of the values of {pit1, pi1,t1,
mt1, mt} and of the rule parameters (c0, c1, c2,
c3), the log price quoted by each ﬁrm remains in
the (0, 1) interval.
Two things should be noted regarding the
price-setting behavior deﬁned by equation (3).
First, price setters do not conceptualize the no-
tions of equilibrium, expectations, or parame-
ters. Their mental ability does not go beyond
mechanically applying rules such as (3) and
they learn through experience which rules are
better. Hence, rational expectations, or even ex-
pectations, are meaningless concepts for these
agents. Similarly, Bayesian learning would be
impossible, since a Bayesian must formulate a
probability model with an underlying parameter
to be learned. These concepts are out of reach
for our agents. Second, the REE is a special case
where all ﬁrms follow the rule given by c2  1,
c1  c3  c0  c4  0. Therefore, it is perfectly
attainable. Failure to converge to the REE, if it
occurs, cannot come from the agents’ inability
to adopt the correct behavior.
The rule coefﬁcients can have any value. To
prevent the economy from having unstable dy-
namics, however, we will consider only those
rules that satisfy the following restriction:
(4) c3  c4  1.
C. Experimentation and the Evolution of
Rules
The economy starts from an arbitrary distri-
bution of prices. At the beginning of time, ﬁrms
select a rule randomly and apply it to set their
price. That rule is selected by picking each
coefﬁcient ci in the interval [1, 1] using a
uniform distribution.
After a rule has been used for at least T
periods, ﬁrms may decide to experiment with
another rule. There are two modes of experi-
mentation, denoted by e  1, 2. At each date t
there is a probability qiet that ﬁrm i abandons its
rule and experiments with another one under
mode e instead. The initial value of qiet is ex-
ogenously set equal to qmax, which is also its
maximum value. The two modes are:
(a) Local mutation (e  1). In such a case the
new rule is deﬁned by
cit1  cit  zit
where  is a parameter capturing the size
of a local mutation, and zit is an i.i.d.
random variable distributed over (1, 1).
(b) Global randomization (e  2). In such a
case the new rule is drawn randomly in the
same way as the initial one.
In both cases, if the new rule does not satisfy
restriction (4), a new rule is drawn until (4) is
satisﬁed.
During the experiment the new rule is used
but the ﬁrm remembers the preceding rule as
well as the average payoff experienced with it
so far. Experimentation lasts for at least T pe-
riods, after which the average payoff per period
is compared with that of the previous rule
(therefore, there is no discounting). If it is infe-
rior, then the ﬁrm returns to the previous rule,
and the probability of experimenting according
to mode e is adjusted downward according to
the following formula:
qiet1  1 	 qiet  qmin.
If it is better, then the experiment continues
as long as the average payoff is higher than that
of the previous rule, up to the point where the
total duration of the experiment equals T , where
T   min(100, T/2), and T is the total length of
time during which the previous rule has been
used. At this point, the new rule is deﬁnitely
adopted, and the probability of experimenting
according to mode m is adjusted upward using
the following formula:
qiet1  1 	 qiet  qmax.
If the average payoff of the experimented rule
falls below that of the previous rule at any point
between T and T , then the experiment is imme-
diately abandoned and one reverts to the previ-
ous rule.
This rather complex procedure is used to
prevent a rule that has proven quite good for a
770 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005very long time to be abandoned in favor of a
rule that has improved on it for a much shorter
time, say because of an unlikely sequence of
shocks. Thus we impose a probation period set
to half the duration of the previous rule before
an experiment is adopted. But, given that ﬁrms
will eventually ﬁnd good rules that will be used
for a very long time, in order to avoid experi-
ments that are too long we put a cap of 100
periods on this probation period.
III. Results
We now describe how the model was solved
numerically and report our main quantitative
results. Table 1 summarizes the values chosen
for the parameters. The total number of ﬁrms is
heavily constrained by computation time and
was set to 10. The minimum length of time a
rule must be used before another can be tried is
set to T  15. Experimentation probabilities
vary between qmin  0.001 and qmax  0.03.
We have set   0.05, and   0.1. The mean
m  was chosen to be equal to 0.6. The benchmark
value for autocorrelation of the money shocks 
is set to zero, which allows for the wider pos-
sible range of variation for the dispersion of
monetary innovations.  was set equal to 3.
We are interested in how the average behav-
ior of the economy depends on  and . There-
fore, we tried 10 values of ,   i(1  m )/10,
for i  1, ... , 10;
13 and 4 values of ,   1, 0.9,
0.8, and 0.7. We pick   5, implying that the
condition  	 (  1)/ is satisﬁed for three
values of  but not for   0.7. Uniqueness is
therefore not granted for that value. Finally,
productivity is normalized to one, and the real
wage parameter  is determined residually to
enforce the Ny*  1 constraint.
Initial prices were drawn from a uniform
distribution over (0, 1). Initial values of ci, i 
0, ... , 3, were drawn using a uniform distribu-
tion over [1, 1], as already stated. I then let the
economy evolve for 500,000 periods, and then
for another 3,000 periods, during which I collect
statistics on the aggregate price level and the
aggregate money stock. This was repeated 10
times for each pair (i, ), thus generating 10
simulations for each set of parameters. For each
of these simulations I characterize the behavior
of the economy by running the following re-
gression over the ﬁnal 3,000 periods during
which statistics were collected:
(5) p  t1  a0  a1mt1  a2mt  b2p  t  t
where p t is the aggregate price level deﬁned as
the average across ﬁrms of individual prices:






Note that this regression is not meant to recover
the rules followed by individual ﬁrms, but the time
series properties of the aggregate price level, sum-
marized by coefﬁcients a0, a1, a2, and b2.
13 The maximum value of i is 10(1  ).
TABLE 1—PARAMETERS OF THE BENCHMARK SIMULATION
Parameter Meaning Value
T Minimum length of experimentation 15
qmax Maximum probability of experimentation 0.03
qmin Minimum probability of experimentation 0.001
 Adjustment speed of experimentation probabilities 0.1
 Size of a local mutation 0.05
m  Mean of log money stock 0.6
 Autocorrelation of money shocks 0
 Curvature of marginal cost curve 3
 Elasticity of substitution between goods 5
a Productivity 1
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b2  0, a1  1, and the regression should
yield an R
2 equal to 1. Even if individual
ﬁrms end up adopting such a rule, one
should expect small deviations from this
ideal point because a fraction of ﬁrms are
experimenting. In the long run, this fraction
should not exceed qmin, as experimentation
should yield lower payoffs than the optimal
rule.
If 0  a1  1 then prices are “rigid” in the
sense that they react less than one for one to
monetary shocks.
If a1  a2  b2 
 1, then money is
“neutral” in the long run, in that prices would
eventually adjust fully to a permanent change
in m. Note, however, that such a change is a
zero-probability event. As long as p is stationary,
it tends to return to its mean, as does m, so that
any rejection of the long-run neutrality hypoth-
esis should be interpreted with caution. Things
would be different if the driving process for m
were I(1). If a1  a2  b2  1, then the
long-run effect of a permanent money shock on
prices is (a1  a2)/(1  b2). The difference
between the long-run and the short-run effects is
equal to a2  a1b2/(1  b2) and is a measure of
price inertia.
14
The key parameter of interest is a1, the re-
sponse to the contemporaneous money innova-
tion. The results are summarized in Figure 1,
where the variance of 
 is indexed by i, the
fraction of the maximum possible dispersion of

. For each parameter set, the reported numbers
are the average across 10 simulations of the
estimated value of a1. At low levels of the
variance of innovations, there is substantial
price rigidity; when the variance becomes
larger, the coefﬁcient is close to the predicted
REE value of 1. Furthermore, prices are stickier
the greater the degree of interactions among
ﬁrms; while for   1, one is close to the REE
at i  2( a1  0.94) or above, for   0.7, a1 is
below 0.9, and exceeds 0.8 only for i  4. For
  0.7, however, there is an eventual, anom-
14 Alternative measures would be the mean lag im-
plicit in (5), ML  a2  a1b2/[(1  b2)(a2  a1)], or
a2  a1b2, which tells us the effect of a purely transitory
money shock on prices one period ahead. The formulas
are pretty similar.
FIGURE 1
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15 That is
not observed for other values of .
Table 2 reports the “long-run” effects of a
monetary innovation, for the two lowest values
of i. We see that the long-run effect is not
necessarily greater than the short-run effect, and
often quite below one. Thus, there is no sign of
long-run neutrality, nor of inertia. As already
stated, nonneutrality in the long run should be
taken with caution, given that actual monetary
shocks are very transitory in these simulations.
Simulations with a high value of , reported in
Section V, suggest a long-run effect substan-
tially above the short-run effect (hence large
inertia), and close to one (hence near long-run
neutrality).
Another feature is the wide dispersion in the
estimated parameters, especially for parameter
values where there is price stickiness (i.e., a low
variance of 
 or a strong degree of interactions).
This is documented in Table 3, and suggests
that the time series behavior of prices after
500,000 periods is quite path-dependent.
Another approach to measuring price sticki-
ness is to compute the ratio between the stan-
dard deviation of the price level and that of the
money stock. This ratio is reported in Table 4,
which conﬁrms the results of Figure 1, that
prices are stickier the greater the degree of
interactions and the smaller the variance of
money shocks.
IV. Elements of Explanation
In this section we provide some intuition
about the results of the preceding section.
Inevitably, there is a heuristic dimension to
the intuition I am about to provide, as is
always the case with numerical results. The
key feature driving the results is the link
between experimentation and interactions be-
tween ﬁrms.
In the model, ﬁrms interact via two channels:
ﬁrst, their costs are affected by their neighbor’s
output whenever   1. Second, they exert
pecuniary externalities because a ﬁrm’s pricing
decisions affect the aggregate price level, which
matters to other ﬁrms. That latter effect is
present even when   1. Because of these
interactions, ﬁrms face two sources of shocks:
monetary shocks and experimentation by other
ﬁrms. They must ﬁnd a rule that does well in the
face of the two types of shocks. This logic
drives them away from ﬁnding the REE, and
instead they tend to converge to rules that ex-
hibit price stickiness.
A. The Role of Global Randomization
Global randomization plays an important
role. Firms periodically experiment with ran-
domly selected rules that on average do not
react to current monetary conditions, since all
coefﬁcients are drawn from a distribution
with zero mean. That is, the way they exper-
iment globally does not reﬂect any prior about
the effect that monetary shocks should have
on average. Global experimentation does not
work well eventually, although it is important
15 That phenomenon may have to do with the fact that
the uniqueness condition is violated for   0.7.
TABLE 2—SHORT-RUN VERSUS LONG-RUN EFFECTS FOR






i  1,   1 0.66 0.51
i  1,   0.9 0.56 0.83
i  1,   0.8 0.44 0.52
i  1,   0.7 0.34 0.48
i  2,   1 0.94 0.86
i  2,   0.9 0.81 0.74
i  2,   0.8 0.68 0.65
i  2,   0.7 0.54 0.71
TABLE 3—STANDARD DEVIATION OF a1
i 1 0.9 0.8 0.7
1 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.2
4 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.15
9 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.18
TABLE 4—RELATIVE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE
AGGREGATE PRICE LEVEL
i 1 0.9 0.8 0.7
1 0.77 0.7 0.65 0.62
4 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.81
9 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.81
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local optimum. In most of our simulations,
the rate of global experimentation has fallen
very close to its minimum value of qmin after
500,000 periods. Nevertheless, the way global
experimentation is conducted has an impor-
tant impact on the long-run behavior of the
economy. To illustrate this, we ran experi-
ments where the distribution of c2 in global
experimentation has a mean of one instead of
zero. That is, global randomization on aver-
age yields rules with money neutrality. These
experiments roughly converge to economies
where money is neutral. How can global ex-
perimentation have such an impact even
though it plays such a small role in the long
run? The explanation is that local mutation
alone generates considerable path depen-
dence, i.e., very little selective pressure.
16
Therefore, even though global randomization
occurs very infrequently, because of strong
path dependence, its characteristics have a
large impact on the time series behavior of the
aggregate price level.
B. Path Dependence
Table 5 illustrates path dependence by report-
ing the average coefﬁcient on money across 10
simulations when the global experimentation
mode has been shut down (i.e., qi2t  0, @t). It
compares two initial conditions: one where
ﬁrms start from the rational expectations rule,
c2  1, ci  0, i  2; the other where they start
from a ﬁxed price rule, ci  0, @i. The esti-
mated coefﬁcient on money cm is reported for
various values of  and , as well as for a model
where   1 and p was replaced by m in the
ﬁrm’s welfare function, which shuts down all
interactions between ﬁrms, including the pecu-
niary externality exerted through the aggregate
price level.
The following interesting pattern emerges.
First, when the initial rule is the REE, the
economy remains at the REE equilibrium.
17
Second, when all interactions are shut, ﬁrms
converge to the REE regardless of initial con-
ditions: there is no path dependence absent
interactions. Third, interactions among ﬁrms
generate a large degree of path dependence.
Fourth, path dependence is stronger the
smaller the variance of monetary innovations,
i.e., the lower i. Fifth, and somewhat surpris-
ingly given the results of Figure 1, local in-
teractions do not seem to reinforce path
dependence as compared to the simple pecu-
niary externality, at least for the particular
experiment of Table 5. Sixth, allowing global
randomization brings the economy signiﬁ-
cantly closer to the REE than having just local
mutations—that is, it is a “useful tool,” even
though its nature generates stickiness in the
long run.
Given that these sets of simulations differ
only by their initial conditions, price stickiness
in the long run must be the “echo” effect of the
initial, ﬁxed-price rule.
To summarize, when path-dependence is
high, infrequent periods of global random-
ization have a lot of inﬂuence on the econo-
my’s long-run behavior. Given that global
randomization on average does not generate
rules that react one for one with the money
stock, that is eventually reﬂected in price
stickiness.
The remaining part of the puzzle is: why is
path-dependence so heavily affected by inter-
actions among ﬁrms and the variance of
innovations?
16 There are some grounds to believe that under pure
local mutation, the economy would eventually converge to
the REE, as the estimated coefﬁcient a1 gets closer to one if
one waits much longer. But I could not establish such
convergence even after waiting a very long time.
17 That is not the case when global randomization is
allowed (see Section V).
TABLE 5—SENSITIVITY TO THE INITIAL RULE WHEN






i  1,   1 0.996 0.257
i  1,   0.8 0.986 0.239
i  1, no interactions 0.999 0.998
i  10,   1 1.0 0.6
i  10,   0.8 0.995 0.81
i  10, no interactions 1.0 0.999
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The way interactions, especially local inter-
actions, between agents magnify path depen-
dence has been seen in a number of contexts
(see Durlauf, 1991, 1996). Here, both the pecu-
niary externality and local interactions imply
that ﬁrms, to some extent, want their prices to
track those charged by other ﬁrms. Rules that
are not good at such tracking will tend to be
rejected, more so the stronger the interactions.
Once one uses a rule that does fairly well at
tracking other ﬁrms’ prices, experiments will
tend to be rejected, even if the new rule were to
perform better provided other ﬁrms could si-
multaneously change their rule. Thus, one is
more likely to revert to the initial rule, which
generates more persistence in pricing behavior.
In other words, it is the lack of coordination
among ﬁrms in setting the timing of experimen-
tation that generates high persistence under
strong interactions.
In addition, strong interactions also magnify
the nonneutrality of global randomization. As
global experimentation by neighbors yields
rules that are not typically reactive to money,
the ﬁrm will tend to reduce its own price sen-
sitivity to money in order to respond to such
periods. By doing so, it also increases the in-
centives by other ﬁrms to be sticky, as they are
affected by its own pricing rules. Thus, rigidity
spreads across ﬁrms, more so the stronger the
interactions.
D. The Role of Monetary Volatility
As in the famous Lucas (1972) mispercep-
tion, ﬁrms face a signal extraction problem,
although of a different type. They are subject to
monetary shocks and shocks coming from ex-
perimentation by other ﬁrms. Rules that are
closer to the REE will perform better the larger
the variance of monetary innovation, because
monetary shocks then represent a greater pro-
portion of the shocks faced by the ﬁrm. This is
indeed what is observed in the previous sec-
tions’ simulations. Monetary volatility also acts
through another channel by increasing path de-
pendence: as Table 5 shows, path dependence is
lower when volatility is higher. Intuitively, the
lower the variance of money shocks, the smaller
the penalty for pursuing rules that react inade-
quately to money shocks but are good are track-
ing other ﬁrms’ price behavior. So, if one starts
with initial rules that are fairly good for such
tracking (as is the case if everybody initially
follows the same, non-REE, rule), one is more
likely to stay close to these rules if the variance
of monetary shocks is smaller.
The preceding discussion implies that it is
crucial, for our results to hold, that learning by
experimentation cannot be insulated from actual
price-setting behavior. If one could experiment
on a microscopic scale, then such experimenta-
tion would not exert externalities upon others,
and there would not be inertia in the price-
setting rules.
V. Robustness Checks and Comparative Statics
I now report some robustness checks and
comparative statics exercise, and provide some
intuition whenever a parameter change seems to
affect the results signiﬁcantly.
A. Robustness
Table 6 reports the effects on the main coef-
ﬁcient of interest, a1, of changing a number of
parameters. For parsimony and to save on com-
puting time, I have performed these exercises
for only four pairs (i, ). The “benchmark”
results correspond to the simulations reported in
Section III.
The following conclusions emerge:
(a) The key results of near-neutrality when the
variance of innovations is high, and that
stronger interactions increase price rigidity,
are robust to all the parameter changes we
have performed.
(b) Changing the size of mutations  (3), the
waiting time before collecting statistics (4),
the number of ﬁrms n (5), the width of the
interval where coefﬁcients are drawn when
there is global randomization (8), or the
demand elasticity  (11) do not seem to
have a signiﬁcant, systematic impact on the
degree of rigidity.
(c) A doubling of the rate of experimentation
(7), or a doubling of the minimum duration
of experiments (6), tends to reduce a1, i.e.,
775 VOL. 95 NO. 3 SAINT-PAUL: SOME EVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATIONS FOR PRICE LEVEL RIGIDITYincrease the level of rigidity. That is con-
sistent with the interpretations provided in
the preceding section: when experimenta-
tion by other ﬁrms is a more important
source of shocks, tracking others’ prices
gets more weight relative to tracking the
money stock, and prices are more rigid.
(d) An increase in the curvature of the cost
function (12) increases price rigidity mod-
erately, but systematically. That result is
paradoxical, as more variable marginal
costs make price rigidity more costly. It
may be due to the fact that  also enters,
along with , in the deﬁnition of the local
productive externality.
(e) An increase in the persistence of shocks (9)
tends to increase the contemporaneous re-
sponse of prices. That is understandable,
since responding adequately to a money
shock is more valuable if it is more persis-
tent. Furthermore, if money shocks are per-
sistent, there is price inertia: the long-run
effect of a money shock is substantially
larger than its short-run effect (10), and one
is not far from long-run neutrality. In con-
trast, with   0, there is no systematic
difference between long-run and short-run
effects. Price setters now correctly imple-
ment long-run neutrality when monetary
shocks have long-lasting effects.
B. Convergence
Comparing simulation results when one waits
one million rather than 500,000 periods before
collecting statistics reveals that the simulations
do not converge in a strict sense: waiting one
million rather than 500,000 periods does not
reduce the standard deviation across simula-
tions of the estimated coefﬁcients (Table 7). It is
their average level across simulations, as well as
their standard deviations, that are essentially
unchanged. But the dispersion of coefﬁcients
across simulations does not go to zero when one
waits longer. Hence, the economy’s response to
monetary shocks in the long run exhibits path
dependence; it is neither entirely arbitrary, since
the means and standard deviations are robust to
changes in the waiting period, nor entirely
pinned down. The simulations do not become
more similar as one waits longer. In other
words, in the space of the parameters that sum-
marize its time series properties, the economy
settles in a well-deﬁned zone, where prices are
TABLE 6—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Experiment
  1, i  1
a1
  0.8, i  1
a1
  1, i  10
a1
  0.8, i  10
a1
1. Benchmark 0.66 0.49 0.99 0.93
2. Starting from REE rule 0.8 0.59 0.98 0.91
3.   0.1 0.75 0.4 0.96 0.9
4. Waiting 10
6 periods 0.78 0.41 0.97 0.95
5. n  20 0.69 0.42 0.96 0.91
6. T  30 0.56 0.36 0.96 0.87
7. Doubling qmin, qmax 0.63 0.39 0.95 0.91
8. ci  [2, 2] 0.57 0.54 0.96 0.68
9.   0.9 0.73 0.55 — —
10.   0.9 (LR effect) 0.97 0.81 — —
11.   3 0.63 0.43 0.97 0.97
12.   4.5 0.61 0.42 0.9 0.86
TABLE 7—DISPERSION OF COEFFICIENTS a1 ACROSS SIMULATIONS WITH DIFFERENT WAITING TIMES
Experiment   1, i  1   0.8, i  1   1, i  10   0.8, i  10
Waiting time (10
5) 51 0 51 0 51 0 5 1 0
Standard deviation 0.15 0.136 0.14 0.137 0.03 0.035 0.068 0.06
776 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005typically rigid, and that zone shifts in a predict-
able and understandable way when parameters
such as  and  change. But where the economy
actually lies in that zone is unstable and
path-dependent.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has provided evolutionary foun-
dations for aggregate price level stickiness in
the face of shocks to nominal aggregate de-
mand. Stickiness evolves when local interac-
tions are strong and the variance of monetary
innovations is low, as an outcome of individual
agents’ tendency to experiment with alternative
pricing rules. A natural extension of the model
would be to introduce idiosyncratic shocks, say
shocks to production costs. The model would
then have the potential to capture the evolution
of the cross-sectional distribution of prices.
18
As we already pointed out, the model could be
applied to a variety of settings where agents are
imperfectly rational, local interactions prevail,
and there are aggregate shocks.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
It is straightforward to check that the pro-
posed equilibrium satisﬁes the optimality con-
ditions. To prove uniqueness, we take the
following steps. First, note that for a given,
arbitrary, out-of-equilibrium value of the aggre-
gate price level p 	 0, there exists a solution
{yi, pi} to the set of equations (4)–(1) which is
symmetrical, i.e., satisﬁes yi  y @i, and pi/p 

















These formulas deﬁne a symmetrical “pseudo-
equilibrium” such that a ﬁrm’s optimality condi-
tions are satisﬁed for a price level which is in
general not consistent with the prices set by ﬁrms.
Second, note that any equilibrium vector pair
(y, p)  ((y1, ... , yN),( p1, ... , pN)) must be a
ﬁxed point of the mapping T(p) deﬁned by
Tpy, p  y ˜, p ˜
 y ˜1, ... , y ˜N, p ˜1, ... , p ˜N
such that













That mapping is conditional on any given
arbitrary price level p. Any equilibrium must be
a ﬁxed point of the T(p) transformation associ-
ated with its corresponding true equilibrium
price level.
Substituting, and eliminating the y ˜s, one can
readily see that the T(p) mapping transforms a
given vector of prices p into p ˜ such that
ln p ˜i  k 
1 	 
1   	 1 ln pi1
where k is a constant.
Clearly, if  	 (  1/), then [(1 
)/1  (  1)]  1 and T(p) is a contraction.
Its ﬁxed point is unique and can only be the
symmetrical pseudo-equilibrium deﬁned by (6)
and (7). But given that any equilibrium must be
such a ﬁxed point, it follows that any equilib-
rium is symmetrical. But only one pseudo-
equilibrium is also an equilibrium, since in
equilibrium one must have q  N
1/(1), which
uniquely deﬁnes p and y in (6) and (7).
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